This letter, written (by Muhammad Ma’thûm
Fârûqî, the third blessed son of Imâm Rabbânî,) as an answer to a letter
from Khwâja Muhamad ’Ubaydullah, one of the sons of Muhammad Bâqî-billah ‘quddisa sirruh’, his father’s
teacher, explains whether the wujûd-i-ilâhî is the same as the Dhât;
proves that the statement, “Nothing
existent in nature ceases to exist, and nothing that does not exist
comes into being,” made by fake scientists, is wrong;
and informs about the kamâlât of namâz:
I offer my hamd to
Allâhu ta’âlâ, the Rabb and the
Creator and the raiser of all ’âlams. I invoke blessings on His beloved Prophet
Muhammad ‘’alaihis-salât-u-wa-s-salâm’
and on all those who are close to that great Prophet. This ignorant person -Hadrat Muhammad Ma’thûm means himself-
has been honoured by receiving a blessed letter which the valuable son of that
great person was so good and so kind as to write for us. O my merciful,
obliging, and exalted sir! The matter of wahdat-i-wujûd is a branch of
knowledge that we have inherited from our grandfathers. Your writing about it
once again for this needy person, (i.e. Muhammad Ma’thûm,) seems to be
labouring the obvious and declaring something that is already known. My
bothering you previously was intended to inform you about a level of knowledge
above the knowledge of wahdat-i-wujûd. The difference between the two levels of
knowledge is similar to the difference between the shell of a walnut and its
(edible) inner kernel. That means to say that what we said was not clear enough
to be understood. What we wrote was taken as hollow, meaningless words.
Hasb-u-nallah wa ni’ma-l-wakîl!
You say, “After the
Dhât-i-ilâhî makes tajallî (becomes manifest), His Attributes begin to make
tajallî, i.e. begin to appear, and their tajallî does not have an end.” A
person with a real ultimate goal should stop chasing other tajallîs once he has
attained the tajallî-i-Dhât, and he should look for the Dhât Himself, Who has
made tajallî. Why should he stoop back to the tajallî of he Attributes? And how
heavy-handed and unlovely it is to dare to say, “After having attained the
highest grade in this path and thereafter making a complete backward descent,
the real existence, which does not resemble anything, is seen in each and every
mote of this universe, in a way that is munazzah (pure and blameless) in every
respect and in a manner that is not comparable to anything.” How do you know
that what is seen in every mote is the Dhât-i-ilâhî, who is the absolutely real
being? A Persia line in English:
It was a mouse that was
seen as a camel in the dream!
Air has been your only
gains in the name of the beverage of Kawthar. You have mistaken the ones that
are ta’ayyun (limited, manifest, visible) for the absolutely real being and
found them munazzah (freed, exempt) from other things. Or perhaps you have
supposed the absolutely real being is inside the muqayyads, i.e. the ta’ayyuns
(limited ones). That supposition would mean to deem the Dhât-i-ilâhî as
non-existent. As a matter of fact, I explained this in my
previous letter. Be it as it may, a person who is in love
with the absolutely real being would not get stuck in a state of adherence to the muqayyads even if the muqayyads were identical with Him. Even
if the muqayyads are identical with the mutlaq (absolute), each and every one of them is different and separate from the rest. It would be short-sightedness to
confuse them with one another and to see no difference between being struck by any one of them and being struck by any other one. Despite the fact that no
difference or separateness exists at that level, the two cases of adoration differ very much from each other. A person who needed an animal would not content
himself with, say, a sheep as an alternative of, say, a horse, although he knew that both of them were animals. The preference would overlook the fact that they
both belong to the animal kingdom and there is no difference between them with respect to their common level of being animals. In your attempt to interpret the
statement made by Bahâ-ad-dîn Bukhârî ‘quddisa sirruh’, a great master of teachers, you say, “(What is meant in) ‘beig ghayr, (i.e. other,)’ is ‘(being) other
than the matlûb, (i.e. desired, wished for;)’ not ‘(being) other than the Haqq, (i.e.
Allâhu ta’âlâ.)’ ” This one runs counter to the former one. When ‘what is seen in every mote is the real absolute (mutlaq) being’, how is there to be
(something) other than the matlûb, and how is it to be denied and rejected? The word ‘ghayr’ should not be given a meaning with its usual meaning. Yes. If that
great master were merely one of those who had tasted the ‘wahdat-i-wujûd’, it would be suitable to interpret his statement. The word ‘mutlaq’, [which means
‘dissimilar to creatures in every respect’ and] which exists in his blessed statement, represents the level of Lâ-ta’ayyun and Ghayb-i-huviyyat. For, the absolutely
real being, with tajarrud (isolation) and tanazzuh (being free from defect) in
every respect, is suitable for that level. It is this munazzah level, which is
too high for knowledge, ma’rifat and mushâhada to reach, that the superior
guides of this path have dissuaded (us) from wishing for and deemed it waste of
time to demand it. Then, a statement to the effect that the absolute being
might be seen in every mote would be meaningless. Given that there is no
dissimilarity in Him and everything seen is Him, what could have been the point
in dissuading from yearning for Him and wishing Him? If the goal is the level
of wahdat, then that level is absolute in one respect. The level that is above
it is absolute (mutlaq) in all respects. Then, it would not be correct to call
the level of wahdat ‘mutlaq haqîqî (truely [or really] absolute)’. The matlûb
(desired, wished for) is later ahead, and the sâlik still has
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some way to go. Hence, it would not be
compatible with having an ultimate desire to fall by the wayside by abandoning
(the search for) the matlûb. Although they do not say that this ta’ayyun
differs from the muta’ayyin, ta’ayyun is ta’ayyun. A person with a righteous
zeal and an ultimate desire should not be a fool to remain here. Those who
progress in the path of Muhammad ‘’alaihis-salâm’ will not stay here, since
that path is the path of adoration and belovedness. Because this ta’ayyun is
the same as all other things and it is not dissimilar to them, those people
will not deprive themselves of demanding the lâ-ta’ayyun one. A Persian couplet
in English:
Grief of separation from the beloved is too much to
bear, though short in measure;
Only one hair in the
eye would be too burdensome to bear!
Question: This ta’ayyun is the
muta’ayyin itself. Then, wouldn’t finding and seeing one of them be the same as
finding and seeing the other?
Answer: If finding the
ta’ayyun is the same as finding Him, why do they, (i.e. the superior guides of
Tasawwuf,) discourage and persuade from trying to find the higher level? That
means to say that finding one of these levels differs from finding tho other
one. Whereas the former has not been prohibited, the latter has been
interdicted.
Question: When that level is
not discoverable or attainable, why do they fall in love with Him, and why do
they waste time trying to find Him?
Answer: If we were to accept
this question, we would answer it as follows: How can love and affection be
prevented for grounds dictated by reason and a faithful lover be dissuaded from
looking for his definitely unattainable darling in the face of the fact that
such deep feelings cannot be helped? A Persian couplet in English:
I adore very much the
curls of your hair;
Not at hand, I know; with this love, I
don’t care!
Poor lovers want to
burn to ashes with their desire to attain their darlings. Perhaps they wish
they were forgotten thoroughly, leaving no names or traces behind them. No one
other than Him will provide them relief. They may obtain nothing of Him; they
may be scolded and rejected; they still yearn for the beloved one. How
beautifully the poet expresses this in the following Persian couplet, in
English:
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Even if I cannot get hold of your skirt,
I will not look at others, let alone flirt!
For the poor lovers,
suffice it for the beloved one to know that they are looking for Him. “He
definitely sees you although you do not see Him.” In most cases, the purpose of
love is to suffer cares and sorrows, so that attainment never occurs to the
lover’s mind. How can this earnest solicitude for the beloved one ever be said
to be waste of time, since the poor lover has made lifetime capital of this
care and sorrow. A Persian couplet in English:
Woe betide the days I
spent without grievances, hundreds of times!
How I wish I’d fallen in this grievous love in earlier times!
You say, “This ma’rifat, i.e. knowing, has its symptoms.” Tawhîd, in actual fact, is shuhûdî; i.e. it
is an event of seeing. It is not wujûdî; that is, it does not actually exist. Why should the so-called symptoms be required, then? All the states of tawhîd
consist in the sâlik’s perception. His attributes do not change. They do not develop into Attributes of
Allâhu ta’âlâ. Their haqîqats do not change. If it were possible for the attributes of the mumkin, i.e. the
creature, to become the same as the Attributes of
Allâhu ta’âlâ, hidâyat on the part of Muhammad ‘’alaihis-salâm’ would have been hidâyat on the part of
Allâhu ta’âlâ. As a matter of fact, Allâhu ta’âlâ declared: “Oh My Habîb (Darling) ‘sall-Allâhu ’alaihi wa sallam’! You cannot bring anyone you like round to hidâyat, to the right way. However,
Allâhu ta’âlâ will bless anyone He likes with hidâyat.” Likewise, a
hadîth-i-sherîf reads: “You know your worldly activities better (than I do)!”
What do these statemenets mean? Could our Prophet ‘sall-Allâhu ’alaihi wa sallam’ have said the same thing concerning the ’ilm-i-ilâhî (knowledge of
Allâhu ta’âlâ)? The âyat-i-kerîmas that purport: “If you knew the ghayb (unknown)!” and “I do not know what He is going to do to me and
to you,” tell about this fact. Don’t all these statements distinguish the attributes
of the creatures from the Attributes of the Creator? An adept sâlik should reap quite a number of benefits from here. For, the purpose of seyr-i-sulûk, i.e. of
progressing in a path of Tasawwuf, and of the riyâzats and mujâhadas being experienced and the inconveniences suffered throughout the course, is to rid oneself
of all kinds of love, with the exception of love of Allâhu ta’âlâ.
And this, in turn, is attained by way of the tawhîd-i-shuhûdî. All these endeavours are intended for the exposition of the fact that we are incapable, poor born
slaves
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and for our realizing that we are a mere nothing. They are not
intended for us to get over the state of being born slaves or (hâshâ) to become
Allah or to attain the kamâlât of His Person. To expect them would be egoism
and conceit. The great master of teachers said: “Being a born slave and being
the owner do not coexist; nor do being a commander and taking commands.”
As for the statement, “To attain true Fanâ at the level of wahdat is the end of this path;” can the
people of wahdat-i-wujûd be said to have attained Fanâ in kamâl (perfectly), inasmuch as they are always in love with the enfus? To be fânî, (i.e. to have
attained Fanâ,) means to have rid oneself of all sorts of love with the exception of love of
Allâhu ta’âlâ. On the other hand, these people, (i.e. people of wahdat-i-wujûd,) are continuously in love with every
mote. Although they do not deem the motes separate from Allâhu ta’âlâ, they are not Him in actual fact. In order to completely separate oneself from whatsoever is other
than Him and to become non-existent, it is necessary to escape this whirlpool and look for Him outside of the enfus and the âfâq. Or let us put it this way: The
so-called properties and symptoms do not appear in this Fanâ. They are attained in the grade of Baqâ. For, during the process of Fanâ and ceasing to exist the
creation is not known of. The creatures are not in forms of substances or attributes. Then, the sâlik may have reached the end of the level of Tawhîd and
attained true Fanâ without possessing any of these symptoms. If attainment of these symptoms is to be the end, the kamâl (perfection), how can attainment of
Fanâ be righteously said to be the end?
Let us come back to
the original point under discussion! If the mumkînât, i.e. the creatures had
existence, then the Fanâ-i-wujûdî would be the case. The fact, however, is that their existence is
only in appearance. Something entrusted to a safekeeper will not become the
safekeeper’s property; it belongs to its owner. What happens here is nothing
but a change in knowledge. However, because Allâhu ta’âlâ declared: “I
shall
meet My slave in such a manner as he expects Me to,” here, too, as this
tawhîd-i-shuhûdî matures, so will the treatment that the sâlik is being
subjected to, and the more will be the symptoms with which he is being blessed.
Others may deny these developments in treatment. For, they are new in their
progress towards tawhîd yet. On the other hand, so deeply have these people
attained the haqîqats of tawhîd and dived into its subtleties that they have
penetrated its true essence and reached high grades. Thereafter, with the help
of Allâhu
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ta’âlâ, they have transcended that grade and attained pearls of
knowledge reserved for Prophets ‘’alaihim-us-salâm’.
O my valuable brother!
Please do write what you know of the ma’rifats of the tawhîd-i-wujûdî, for they
are valuable states to experience. Who on earth could say anything against
them. Greater ones of the Awliyâ have said many things about them. Although
they have said those things in a state of intoxication caused by affection and
excessive love, their having said them is an indication of their value. My
grandfather ’Abd-ul-Ahad ‘quddisa sirruh’ was very advanced in the
tawhîd-i-wujûdî. He wrote high-level books in that progressive subject.
Nevertheless, he would never contravene any one of the adabs of Islam. So were
all the other blessed people who knew the haqîqat, (i.e. truth, inner essence
of the matter.) However, it is so disconcerting that superiors like you should
dislike other superiors, believe that their knowledge is the only true
knowledge, and disesteem others’ knowledge. Likewise, to look on
Muhyiddîn-i-’Arabî as the finality of the Awliyâ means to altogether deny the
fact that our superiors were among the Awliyâ. Such daring assertions on the
part of people noble by creation are flabbergasting. Even more stunning than
these is your very cordial account of Ibni Sînâ (Avicenna). But his heresies
caused his disbelief and deviation. Imâm Ghazâlî ‘rahmatullâhi ’alaih’ quotes
statements made by ancient Greek philosophers and adds: “They and their
followers, such as Fârâbî (al-Farabi) were disbelievers.” [Hence, we should not
believe the ignorantly concocted and poisonous writings in the religious books
written by those disbelievers and by European revolutionary leaders and in
their translation, and we should not let them misguide us. We should not read
the book of namâz that was written by Ibni Sînâ and which reflects his
philosophical views. Imâm Rabbânî ‘rahmatullâhi ta’âlâ ’alaih’ cites passages
from Ibni Sînâ’s book entitled Mustazâd and says that the statements in those passages show that the
person who made them is a disbeliever and a zindiq, in the final section of his
blessed book Ma’ârif-i-ladunniyya.] Our Prophet ‘sall-Allâhu ’alaihi wa sallam’ said about Ibni Sînâ in a dream had by one of our superiors: “Allâhu ta’âlâ has carried him to heresy with his own ’ilm (knowledge).” Someone else also had a similar dream. We would not be astounded so much to hear such
statements (as yours) from others. But no degree of astonishment would be overemphatic to feel when something slightly reminiscent of statements of this sort on
the part of noble persons like you reaches the ears of your
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servants. From astonishment has the daring to write so arisen. I hope
you will forgive me. My dear sir! Our exalted master and teacher, a muayyid of
Islam, stated as he was about to pass: “I
have
realized well that the ‘tawhîd’ is a narrow path. The avenue that is broad is
another thing.” You say in your letter that they, [i.e. Muhammad Bâqî ‘quddisa
sirruh’,] were at a level to see the wahdat (unity) in the kathrat (plurality).
This attempt of yours to give another meaning to that statement of his, which
he made during his passing, must be because you have not heard about the reason
for his making that statement. Why should a meaning be searched for it, since
it is not the only statement made by that noble person. Besides, its meaning is
quite clear. A statement with an obvious meaning would not be given another
meaning. In addition, it was not apropos of nothing that he made this
statement. A Persian couplet in English:
Find me a peaceful night, and with a nice full moon, too!
Let me
tell you all, as we sail off into the blue!
With him saying so and
being at that rank, you should follow him, [who is your father,] more than does
anyone else. Even if you become carried away by currents of kashf and hâl, you
should adhere to the way guided by your master teacher! You say, “These ma’rifats
and pieces of knowledge are both reasonable and agreeable with traditions that
have been conveyed.” Most of the traditions that you exemplify here belong to
the group termed ‘mutashâbihât’, [which are traditions whose meanings seem
counter to the other widely-known traditions and which therefore require
interpretation.] As for the word ‘reasonable’; it is confined to matters that
the human mind can comprehend. The human mind is a bird that cannot fly up to
the level to tawhîd or receive messages from there. Jelâl-ad-dîn Devânî
‘rahmatullâhi ta’âlâ ’alaih’, (833 [1426 A.D.] - 908 [1502]), a profound
scholar, states that this matter is without the frames of the human mind.
Mawlânâ Abd-ur-Rahmân Jâmî ‘rahmatullâhi ta’âlha ’alaih’, (817 [1414 A.D.],
Jâm, Iran - 898 [1492], Herat,) states: Facts beyond the reach of mind are
perceived by way of kashf and mushâhada, [i.e. by the heart’s eye;] mind cannot
grasp them. Likewise, the sense organs cannot sense facts that mind
understands.
As it has been
understood by way of kashf and mushâhada, the real being whose existence is
indispensable is neither kullî nor juz’î, [that is, neither an unbreakable
mote, nor a plurality that can be broken into parts.] Materialists say,
“Something non-existent
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will never come into being, and something existent will never cease to exist. It is needless to prove this fact. Anyone can find it.” These words
of theirs are true as long as they concern human beings. It is an absolute fact that human beings cannot make something out of nothing. They cannot create
anything. Yet these words are wrong when they concern Allâhu ta’âlâ. No one, let alone everyone, would say so; nor would such words admit of any proving; they are false products of fancy and imagination. To make
such statements means to deny the existence of Allâhu ta’âlâ. Allâhu ta’âlâ’s making things from nothing and creating all beings from nothing and annihilating all of them are not astonishing events, considering His
Power. To make such statement means to say that the ’âlam (entire universe) is eternal, and that it was not created out of nothing and later, which in turn is
an act of disbelief. For, it is one of the credal tenets of all the past religions and dispensations to believe that the universe, with all its motes, was
created later; all religions are unanimous in this regard. The so-called statements are contradictory also to the âyat-i-kerîma which purports: “Doesn’t man think that
we created him beforehand. Yet before that he had been nothing.” Qâdî Beydâvî (Baydâwî)
‘rahmatullâhi ta’âlâ ’alaih’, (d. 685 [1286 A.D.], Tabriz,) who was greatly
respected by all the other superior authors of Tafsîrs of the Qur’ân al-kerîm, explained this as
follows in his Tafsîr: “Man was adam, i.e. non-existent.” Their statements allude
also that
Allâhu ta’âlâ is unable to do anything. For, they say that He does not make
existence from non-existence. And something that already exist needn’t be
brought into existence. On the other hand, if something that exists will never
cease to exist, as they say, then things that exist will not need the Creator
so that they may maintain their existence. In fact, that would also mean
incapability on the part of Allâhu ta’âlâ to make things non-existent. I
wonder what those people would say about the properties and motions of objects? Everyone
observes the continuous process of newcomings and annihilations among beings. In short, their statements are synonymous with denial of
Allâhu ta’âlâ. Allâhu ta’âlâ is far too high from
such things.
Also disagreeable with
the (creed of) Ahl as sunnat is to say that the Attributes of Allâhu ta’âlâ are the same as His
Person. The author of the book Te’arruf, [Shaikh Abû Bakr Muhammad bin Abî Is-haq Ghulâbâdî
‘rahmatullâhi ta’âlâ ’alaih’] states: “All the superior guides of Tasawwuf have
said that the Attributes are neither the same as Him nor separate from Him.”
Even if we were
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to agree with that, it would suffice for us that the adam counterparts of the Attributes, [- ‘adam’ means ‘non-existent’ -,] are separate in the
’ilm-i-ilâhî (knowledge of Allâhu ta’âlâ). I
explained at length in my previous letter that His Attribute Wujûd, [i.e. being existent,]
is separate from the Dhât-i-ilâhî (Person of Allâhu ta’âlâ).
Let me touch upon the subject once again as it seems apropos. My respectable brother! If a person with an immaculate creation and who seeks for closeness
carries on an introspective observation in his sahîh (true) conscience, i.e. in his inner findings, and meditates well, he will come up with the realization
that he could not tolerably imagine a situation wherein Allâhu ta’âlâ would need any being other than Himself
in His own existence or (in which) He would not have wujûd, existence, by
Himself, so that He would need an attribute of wujûd. However, he will realize,
again, that the haqîqat and the inner essence of Allâhu Himself are not the
same as those of wujûd, i.e. existence. For, since His wujûd, existence, does
not need someone else, it would be meaningless to suppose that His haqîqat
consists in that existence. Why should a word that has served as an attribute
for others and therefore has been possessed by others be required to be given
as a name for a Person Who exists in the outside with His own being? Besides,
Islam has not declared that name. While the superior guides of Tasawwuf have
separated all sorts of relations, references, and considerations from the
Person of
Allâhu ta’âlâ Himself, why don’t some of those great people separate the
wujûd, existence, too? To separate wujûd from the Dhât (Person) of Allâhu ta’âlâ would not mean to impute non-existence to Him. For, non-existence also is a relation, an attribute. No
relation or reference exists in the Person of Allâhu ta’âlâ. Moreover, those great people’s saying that wujûd is the same as Him is not a denial of wujûd. They do
not say, for instance, that Allâhu ta’âlâ Himself exists and
that wujûd is a mere word. For, according to those great people, the haqîqat of Allâhu ta’âlâ is absolute wujûd (existence). Could this ever mean denial of wujûd? Could something itself ever be
denied? The truth of the matter is that the haqîqat of Allâhu ta’âlâ, i.e. He Himself, is distinct from wujûd. He does not need the attribute wujûd in His own Being. He
exists by Himself. Showing that He does not need the attribute ‘wujûd’ does not require saying that He Himself is the same as ‘wujûd’. How would it be if we
said that He is higher than the attribute ‘wujûd’?
As it is the divine habit of Allâhu ta’âlâ, whatsoever is in the ’âlam of haqîqat, He has shown a sample, an image of it in this
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’âlam of symbols and appearances. It is
through these images that man finds a way for himself to haqîqats. By the same
token, the sample to show in this world that Allâhu ta’âlâ exists by Himself and not with ‘wujûd’ is
the worldly attribute ‘wujûd’. The attribute ‘existence’ exists by itself. It
does not exist with a separate ‘wujûd’.
Also, the statement,
“Allahü teâlâ Himself exists,” is an informing. It does not mean that there
exists a ‘wujûd’ that can exist by itself. Shaikh Emân ‘rahmatullâhi ta’âlâ
’alaih’ states: “The haqîqat of Allâhu ta’âlâ is mawjûd (existent). Anything other than Him is adam,
non-existence. And adam, in its turn, cannot be the beginning of things. For,
its haqîqat never changes. That is, it can never cause existence. Then, the
beginning is that ‘wujûd’. And it, (i.e. the beginning,) was by way of
temeththul (semblance), not by tejezzî’ (disintegration).” These statements are
wrong, from several points of view. For, we say, first of all, that it is not
agreeable with the creed of Ahl as-Sunnat to state that the haqîqat of Allâhu ta’âlâ is ‘wujûd’. Our second answer is that the Attributes of
Allâhu ta’âlâ, according to the (credal tenets of) Ahl as-Sunnat, are separate from His Person. Therefore, it would
not be correct to say that anything other than Allâhu ta’âlâ is adam. As a third answer, if ‘adam’ becomes ‘wujûd’, then the
haqîqat will have changed. Yet if ‘adam’ becomes ‘mawjûd’ nothing will be
necessary. Scholars have said that ‘wujûd’ does not exist. That statement of
theirs does not express a change of haqîqat. The fourth point of view is this:
If ‘adam’ becomes ‘mawjûd’ then there will be a change of haqîqat. However,
there will not be a change of haqîqat if ‘adam’ appears to be ‘mawjûd’.
Fifthly, what is meant by the word ‘beginning’ in one of his afore-quoted
statements is the thing called the ‘primordial (ball of) matter. For, it was
made the beginning only by disintegration and formation. Nothing could be as
base as saying that Allâhu ta’âlâ is the primordial matter of the universe.
The Dhât-i-ilâhî (Person of
Allâhu ta’âlâ) will be meant when the word ‘beginning’ is used in the meaning ‘inventor, creator from nothing’.
However, tejezzî’ and temeththul, (defined above,) are not needed in this meaning. The final âyat-i-kerîma of Yasîn Sûra purports: “Be!’ We say to anything We choose (to create), and it is.” The sixth point of
view is: It is meaningless to say that the opposite is the Dhât-i-ilâhî is
adam. It is some other ‘wujûd’ which is the opposite of ‘adam’, and it means
‘to come into existence’. The seventh point of view: Why should ‘wujûd’ be
necessary when there is no longer a relative adam, [i.e. an adam that is
non-existent
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in one respect and not in every respect,] since ‘wujûd’ is not
an opposite of ‘adam’? Also wrong are their statements: “The adams in the
’ilm-i-ilâhî cannot be the origins of things, either. For, the ’ilm (knowledge)
of Allâhu
ta’âlâ is
’ilm-i-hudûrî. In other words, He knew in the eternal past. Why should there
have been adams there, (i.e. in the ’ilm-i-ilâhî,) and (why should) they be the
origins of things, since changes do not exist there, (i.e. in the
’ilm-i-ilâhî?) Whence did these adams come into ’ilm? Something what does not
exist in one regard can not have a place in ’ilm (knowledge).” For one thing,
whether they call the knowledge of Allâhu ta’âlâ ‘hudûrî’ or else, to say that Allâhu ta’âlâ does not have knowledge of relative adams means to say that He does not know them, which is not something appropriate to
say about Allâhu ta’âlâ. Moreover, we beg to differ with an argument that something non-existent in one respect will not be known. For, we think
of quite a number of things that we know do not exist. Our third objection is this: Things that would come into being were relative adams as they were
non-existent. It would not be correct to say that they were non-existent in all respects. Sadr-ad-dîn Konevî (or Qonawî) ‘quddisa sirruh’, (d. 671 [1272 A.D.],
Konya, Turkey,) states: There are two kinds of being a thing: A thing that is thâbit; and a thing that is mawjûd. A thing that is mawjûd is something that
exists in the outside. A thing that is thâbit is something that exists in knowledge although it does not exist in the outside and it does not have a maker.
Then, a mutlaq ma’dum, [i.e. something that is non-existent in all respects,] is not a thing. For, it is non-existent both as a thâbit one and as a mawjûd one.
On the other hand, adams that are relative are thâbit things. On account of their being ‘things’ they are commanded, “Kun [Be]!” Thereby they come into being in the outside. Shaikh (Sadr-ad-dîn) Konevî ‘rahmatullâhi ta’âlâ ‘alaih’
said that Allâhu ta’âlâ’s knowing the things that would come into existence as they were in ‘adam’ yet does not mean His
knowing the ma’dûm. For, such eternal adams exist in the Umm-ul-kitâb. The Qalam-i-a’lâ took some of them, and the Lawh-il-mahfûz detailed those few.
Jelâl-ad-dîn Devânî ‘rahimahullâhu ta’âlâ’ says that adam also is one of the manifestations of the wujûd-i-haqîqî. As a matter of fact, Imâm Ghazâlâ
‘rahmatullâhi ta’âlâ ‘alaih states as follows in some of his books: “Origin of the universe is adam. Having mercy on the adam they brought it into being. Adam
was non-existent in its origin. First adam was created. To say that adam is eternal means to make it a partner to
Allâhu ta’âlâ in being eternal. Hence, adam is not eternal. When adam, the
origin of the universe,
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is not eternal, adam will not be eternal; hence, it is hâdith
(that which came into being later). This is what the (scholars of) Ahl
as-Sunnat meant when they said, ‘The ma’dûm is not a thing.’ ” Our fourth
objection is: These statements, (i.e. the ones quoted after the seventh point
of view,) contain a series of contradictions. First it is argued the relative
adams exist in knowledge and that therefore they can not be origins of things.
Thereafter this argument is refuted with the argument that ’ilm is hudûrî, as
well as with the argument that that which is not thâbit in one regard cannot
exist in knowledge. Fourthly, we say that the Sofiyya-i-aliyya said that the
a’yân-i-thâbita were relative adams, and looked on them as the haqîqats,
origins of creatures.
Then you write: The
things that exist in the ’ilm-i-ilâhî have an origin. That origin is ’ilm
(knowledge), and perhaps the ’âlim (the one who knows). But what is the origin
of adams? Here is our answer: The origins of adams are the kamâlât-i-ilâhî,
which have been separated from one another in the ’ilm-i-ilâhî. Who would disagree
with this answer of ours?
You write: To be a true qul, (i.e. a true born slave of
Allâhu ta’âlâ, is to love Him and to give up anything other than Him. That is, it is to turn away not only from the
world but also from the Hereafter. It is true. However, everybody says so. The symptom to distinguish between people true to their words and liars is to adhere
to Islam And the criterion to measure the sincerity and profundity of this love is adherence to the sunnat, [i.e. to the rules of Islam,] and strict abstention
from bid’ats. Words devoid of these symptoms are not cared for. Statements like, “I have turned away from all,” are rather construed as, “I have
held fast to all.”
My dear sir! You complain about the abundance of thoughts and doubts. The more knowledge of creatures,
the more doubts. When they are forgotten about, the doubts will no longer remain. Then, the point to be dwelled on is whether to be aware of things or to froget
about them. From everything and every creature there leads a path to Allâhu ta’âlâ. For, all creatures, they themselves and their properties, are works of His Power. A vigilant person
who finds the owner of these works will perceive the secret path and spiritual tie. Why should things be united with Allâhu ta’âlâ or integrated with Him so that they may signify Him or show Him? Smokes are signs of a fire; yet what unity do they have with the fire, and in
what way are they integrated with the fire? If a person loves Allâhu ta’âlâ, only a vague implication or a clue will suffice for him to turn towards Him. Nothing will cause him to forget
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Him. Everything that he sees will be a work of His power in his
view and will orient him towards the Owner of the work. Therefore, nothing will
call the ’ârif to itself, but all things will refer him to the Owner of the
work they represent. They will direct the eyes of the ’ârif’s heart from
themselves onto their Owner. In contrast, with those poor people who believe
that Allâhu
ta’âlâ has
united with things, all such summonings will finish up stranded on the
summoner. Those people will be pulled towards their home-made darlings, who
represent themselves as their beloved ones. Every ugly devil, putting on all
their coquettish airs and tricks, will be a barrier as insurmountable as
alexander’s Rampart in disguise of the beloved one. A Persian couplet in
English:
Pretty damsels have
hidden their cheeks, the devil with all its coquetry;
I am so confused, I am about to lose my
mind in uncertainty.
If the existence and
attributes of kamâl (perfection) of the mumkin, of the creation, are the shades
and reflections of that holy rank, there is a path leading to the origin from
the image. Yet the image is not the origin.
I, the
faqîr, have never said that once the ’ârif has attained kamâl his knowledge of
things is to be called the ’ilm-i-hudûrî. I
have said that it is not ’ilm-i-husûlî, but that does not mean to say that it is
’ilm-i-hudûrî. For, Allâhu ta’âlâ’s
knowledge of things, [i.e. His knowing all,] is not one of the kinds of knowledge called ‘hudûrî’ or ‘husûlî’. It is merely an unfolding of the ‘ilm-i-ilâhî,
which distinguishes known things from one another. None of those things has an image in knowledge. What is meant by ‘things in the knowledge of
Allâhu ta’âlâ’
is ‘things distinguished from one another in the ’ilm-i-ilâhî’. Wherever those things are, they are munkashif to
Allâhu ta’âlâ, [i.e. open to His
knowledge.] To call Allâhu ta’âlâ’s
knowing things ’ilm-i-hudûrî or ’ilm-i-husûlî will be welcomed
by people
of the tawhîd-i-wujûdî. Once an ’ârif has attained kamâl, his knowledge also
will attain that perfection. Everything, wheresoever it is, will be munkashif
to the ’ârif’s knowledge. Things will not have images in the ’ârif’s mind. That
knowledge is neither hudûrî nor husûlî. People who judge things with their own
minds will not believe or accept these statements of ours; yet our statements
have not been directed to them. These things are spiritual states called
‘dhawq’ (or zawq), and the only way to know them is by tasting them. They are matters
of conscience. [That is, they are for the heart to discover.] They are not
argumentative facts that can be explained by convincing. What
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is amazing about this ma’rifat (spiritual knowledge) is that
knowledge (in this respect) is not hudûrî. Nor will there appear an image of
the thing being known. Such things can not be understood without tasting.
Dear sir! The meaning
of the statement, “The namâz is above tajallîs and mushâhadas,” is this: We
definitely know that Allâhu ta’âlâ is other than (what is observed by) that tajallî and mushâhadas.
To be stranded in them means to get stuck and remain adherent to images, nay,
to semblances and resemblances, which are quite other things that have nothing
to do with the matlûb (desired, wished for). A person who says that everything
is the same as Allâhu ta’âlâ is one who has been intoxicated with love (of Allâhu ta’âlâ). Namâz, alone, is the messenger from the very matlûb and maqsad (purpose, goal). Namâz is the one and only sign of that signless rank.
Closeness attained by way of (performing) namâz can not be found anywhere else. Our Prophet ‘sall-Allâhu ’alaihi
wa sallam’ stated: “During (the performance of) namâz all the curtains between the qul (slave) and Allâhu ta’âlâ will go up.” It is for that reason
that he called namâz ‘Mi’râj’. Therefore, great care should be taken for a
flawless performance of namâz. To endeavour for the perfection of namâz (being
performed) means to keep those tajallîs and mushâhadas away from namâz. This is
a great blessing which Allâhu ta’âlâ bestows on anyone He likes. His blessings are great and His
kindness is plentiful.
A perfect performance
of namâz falls to the lot of those superiors who have attained high grades by
progressing through the path of Nubuwwat. Most of those who are in the path of
Wilâyat cannot attain that level. Closeness of those great superiors is
extraordinary. Their knowledge and their secrets are peculiar to them. The path
through which they attain is unlike this path. Theirs is an avenue along which
progressed, and attained the matlûb, Prophets ‘’alaihim-us-salawât-u-wa-l-barakât’ and their Sahâbas and
very few chosen ones of this Ummat (Muslims). Perhaps it is this avenue that
our master and guide, [i.e. Muhammad Bâqî-Billah ‘rahmatullâhi ’alaih’,] who
was the chief of the ’ârifîn, indicated when he stated: “The main road is quite
another thing.” It is possible for a person to attain this high zenith through
the path of Wilâyat as well. Perhaps there are people who have attained
thereby. Namâz should not be considered to merely consist in a series of
prostrations and genuflections. Namâz has a haqîqat above all the other
haqîqats in the ’âlam of the ghayb
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(unknown to all creatures). Little, if
any, will be understood about the perfect namâz by those who do not recognize
the people who have attained that haqîqat[1]. Namâz is a beauty that attracts hearts.
It is as if its beauty has been put into a form in this metaphorical world.
Graces of that darling appear in the forms of khushû’ (stance of profound
respect) and adab (most beautiful way of doing something, e.g. performing the
acts in namâz) of namâz in this world. What can a person who dislikes this
outward form and appearance of namâz understand from its haqîqat (inner
essence)? How can a person who is not in love with the graces and charms of
that beauty know the value of khushû’ and tumânînat? In short, so high is the
beauty, the elegance of namâz that these absurd words that we use fall far too
short of describing it. So superior are its values that this broken pen of mine
can not transliterate them. Yet I trust myself to the
nectarious breaths of those superior people who have attained that great
fortune! I rely on the good news in return for serving and loving them. A
Persian couplet in English:
If the hair of that beauty
touched my palm, musk would spew from it all over;
If I could only embrace
that lunar-faced, many suns would rise from me all over.
Yâ Rabbî (Oh, my
Allah)! Thou art not as they suppose or say! May salâms and salvations be to Prophets ‘’alaihis-salawât-u- wa-t-teslîmât’, who have informed us about Thee! Hamds and gratitudes be to
Allâhu ta’âlâ, Who created these ’âlams and keeps them in existence every moment and blesses bodies with rizq
(sustenance, subsistence, food) and souls with nutrition and hearts with nûr (light), and bestows the gift of progress upon His quls (born slaves)!
My hope and request
from your all-embracing mercy and kindness is this: Please do not write to this
disobedient and inhuman slave of Allâhu ta’âlâ any more. Leave him alone in his corner of hopelessness so that
he should mourn for his sins and bemoan the griefs of his insolences! May Allâhu ta’âlâ bless those who walk
along the way shown by Prophets with salvation! Âmîn.
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[1] Please see the thirty-fourth chapter for the
‘haqîqat’ of namâz.
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