To us, a mu’jiza is something proving the truthfulness of a person who said he was
a Prophet. There were conditions
for a mu’jiza:
1 — Allâhu ta’âlâ made it in the absence of
ordinary means, whereby to help His Prophet be confirmed.
2 — It had to be extraordinary.
Ordinary things, such as the sun’s rising in the East every day or flowers
blooming in the spring, could not be mu’jizas.
3 — Others had to be incapable
of doing it.
4 — It had to happen whenever
the person who announced his prophethood wished it to.
5 — It had to agree with his
wish. For example, if he said that he would enliven a certain dead person and
if some other marvel took place, for example, if a mountain was broken into
two, instead, it would not be a mu’jiza.
6 — The mu’jiza happening upon
his wish should not belie him. For example, while he was miraculously talking
with a certain beast, if the beast said, “This man is a liar,” it would not be
a mu’jiza.
7 — The mu’jiza should not
happen before he said he was a Prophet. Wonders that happened before [the announcement of
his prophethood], such as ’Îsâ’s[1] (’alaihi ’s-salâm) talking when he was in a cradle, his being
handed dates when he asked for dates from a withered-up tree, and in Muhammad’s
(alaihi ’ssalâm) childhood, the cleavage of his chest and his heart being
cleansed by washing, there being a cloud over his head continuously and his
being greeted by trees and stones were not mu’jizas, but karâmas. They are
called irhâsât
(preparatory signs of a prophet). They emphasized prophethood.
It is possible for such karâmas to happen through Awliyâ’ as well. Before
Prophets were informed of their prophethood, their status was not lower than
that of the Awliyâ’. Karamâs were seen from them. A mu’jiza could happen
immediately after a Prophet is informed of his prophethood. For example, if he had said that
such and such an event would take place a month later, the event would become a
mu’jiza when it took place. But it would not be necessary to believe in his
prophethood before it took place.
A mu’jiza demonstrating that a Prophet is telling the truth is not
only a requirement of the intellect. That is, it is unlike the case of some
work denoting the existence of its agent. For the intellect’s realizing that
something is the proof of something else requires some relationship between the
two things. When the proof is seen, the existence of the related thing, not the
existence of something else, is realized. The case is not so with a mu’jiza.
For example, heavens being broken into pieces, stars being scattered and
mountains being pulverized will take place when the end of the world comes, at
the time of Doomsday. This will not be the time for the coming of a Prophet. These are the mu’jizas
foretold by every Prophet. But, it is not necessary for those who hear about them to know
that they are mu’jizas. So is the case with a Walî’s karâma being the mu’jiza
of a Prophet, though it does not
have any connection with that Prophet. What we have stated so far is explained in detail in the book Sharh-i mawaqif by Sayyid Sherîf al-Jurjânî.
According to most ’ulamâ’,
though open tahaddî (challenge), that is, saying,
“Go ahead and do the same! But you can’t!” is not a condition for a mu’jiza,
the meaning of a mu’jiza contains tahaddî. Because a tahaddi is not a matter of
question in the reports made about the states of the Rising Day and future
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[1] Jesus.
events, these are not mu’jizas against disbelievers. The Believers
believe that these reports are mu’jizas. The karâmas of Awliyâ’ are not
mu’jizas because they do not claim prophethood and because there is no tahaddî
in them. The fact that such non-challenging wonders do not prove the
truthfulness of a person claiming prophethood does not necessarily show that
mu’jizas do not prove it. On the contrary, this is what is expected from a
mu’jiza.
Question: “Mu’jizas prove the
truthfulness of the person claiming prophethood because they are wonders. Does
a mu’jiza have a special effect on proving [prophethood]?”
Answer: Such is not the actual case. A
mu’jiza’s proving the validity of a claim of prophethood is due to the fact
that others cannot do it, which means a mu’jiza has a special effect. In fact,
this is the real proof.
Question: “In Sharh-i Mawâqif, Sayyid Sherîf al-Jurjânî says, ‘Naql (narration) cannot be a proof
by itself because it is necessary also to believe in the truthfulness of the
person who says that he is a Prophet, and this takes place by the intellect’s admitting it. Upon
seeing a mu’jiza, the intellect believes that a Prophet has told the truth.’ This passage from al-Jurjânî says that a
mu’jiza demonstrating a Prophet’s truthfulness is judged through the intellect, whereas a while
before he said that it would not be judged through the intellect. Don’t these
two statements of his contradict each other?”
Answer: The passage immediately above
says that the intellect studies the mu’jiza that proves the truthfulness of a Prophet. It does not say whether or not
the intellect has an effect on the mu’jiza’s proving his truthfulness. Even if
we were to admit that it says that it has some effect, it still does not say
that this is judged only through the intellect. Since there is no one saying
that the intellect has no effect in this affair, such a contradicition is out
of place. Sayyid al-Jurjânî’s statement was made while explaining a narrated
(naqlî) mu’jiza, for which such a statement is most appropriate.
A mu’jiza’s denoting a Prophet’s truthfulness is not a belief resulting out
of hearing, either. It is natural indication. That is, when a mu’jiza is seen, Allâhu ta’âlâ creates in the person who sees it the
knowledge that the person announcing his prophethood is telling the truth. Such
is Allâhu ta’âlâ’s divine law. This is so
because, though it is possible for a liar to display
a
mu’jiza, it has never happened. If the person announcing his prophethood lifts
up a mountain and says, “If you believe me, this mountain shall go back to its
place. If you don’t believe me, it will fall on your heads,” and if they see
that the mountain moves back towards its place when they want to believe and
towards them when they think of not believing, it will be understood, through
divine law, that he is telling the truth. Yes, it is possible - in view of the
intellect- for such an absolute mu’jiza to happen from a liar, but it is not
the divine law of Allâhu ta’âlâ. That is, it has
never been seen.[1]. This
is exemplified as follows: A man claimed to be a ruler’s messenger and said,
“If you don’t belive me, take my letter to the ruler.” The letter read: “If it
is true that I am your messenger, get down from your throne and sit on the
floor!” They took the letter to the ruler who read it and did as it was
written. Those who saw this believed definitely that he told the truth. This
belief is unlike the case of “likening the unkown to the witnessed,” that is,
understanding [the existence of] something not seen by seeing something else.
For, a mu’jiza definitely proves truthfulness. According to the Mu’tazila, it
is not possible for a liar to display a mu’jiza.
Magic and similar things are the occurrence
of certain events by doing the things that are their causes, or, sometimes,
they are illusions which figure up in one’s imagination though they do not
really exist. They are not wonders.
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[1] The intellect admits a liar's displaying mu'jizas and says, "Since Allâhu ta'âlâ is Almighty, He can do this, too." This conclusion, which is not compatible with divine law, or even the rare occurrence of events suitable with this conclusion, does not harm our knowledge of events that are compatible with the divine law of Allâhu ta'âlâ. For example, killing or revivifying by the ad-Dajjâl, the liar who will come towards Doomsday, does not change our knowledge about his being a liar. The fact that Nimrod's fire did not burn Ibrâhîm ('alaih 's-salâm) does not change Allâhu ta'âlâ's law that gives a burning capacity to fire. However, the occurrence of events contradicting information acquired by the intellect through proofs gives harm to this information.